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WHY COERCION IS WRONG WHEN
IT’S WRONG
Benjamin Sachs
It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong
because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of
those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the
wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the eﬀect such
actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out
that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the ethics of coercion)
constrains what we can say about the ethics of warning and oﬀering.
Importantly, our favoured explanation of the wrongness of certain kinds of
threatening should not commit us to condemning as wrong parallel cases of
warning and oﬀering. My positive project is to show how this can be done. I
defend the claim that wrongful coercion is nothing more than the issuing of a
conditional threat to dowrong, and that an agent’s issuing of a conditional threat
to do wrong is wrong because it constitutes motivation for that agent to adopt
the announced intention to do wrong. The idea of explaining the wrongness of
wrongful coercion in this way has gone unnoticed because we have thus far been
mistaken about what a threat is. In this essay I present my moral analysis of
coercion only after presenting a careful descriptive analysis of threats. On my
view, it is essential to a threat that the announced intention is one that the agent
does not possess before announcing it. This analysis makes it possible to
elucidate the descriptive diﬀerences between threats, warnings and oﬀers, which
sets up the later project of elucidating the moral diﬀerences between them.
Keywords: coercion, threat, warning, oﬀer, intention
1. Introduction
At the broadest level there are at most two kinds of coercion: the kind that
involves the use of force and the kind that involves the use of a conditional
threat.1 In this essay I’m concerned solely with the latter kind. My goal is to
present a novel theory about why this kind of coercion (hereafter referred to
simply as ‘coercion’) is wrong when it’s wrong. But, before proceeding, three
points about methodology are in order.
First, the fact that I aim to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong
should not be taken as a sign that I believe coercion is sometimes not wrong.
Rather, it represents an attempt to remain neutral on the question. My plan
is to identify a class of actions that uncontroversially counts as coercion, and
1I say ‘at most’ since some people reject the idea that the use of force counts as coercion. Lamond [1996] took
this stance, though he later rescinded it [2010]. The point needn’t be argued here.
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64 Benjamin Sachs
is uncontroversially wrong, and explain why those actions are wrong. I will
then argue that an explanation of why those actions are wrong constitutes
an explanation of why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.
Second, one might be tempted to object straight oﬀ that I am begging
important questions by assuming that only threats can constitute coercion
and hence implicitly denying that people can be coerced by oﬀers or their
circumstances and that oﬀers and circumstances can be coercive. Actually,
however, I am not denying this. I am denying that an oﬀer can constitute
coercion and that one’s circumstances can constitute coercion. ‘Coercion’ is
the name of a type of action. ‘Coercive’ describes an eﬀect that some actions
and circumstances have on people, who are in turn ‘coerced’ by those
actions and circumstances. I do not insist that only coercion is coercive.
Now one might worry that if other things besides coercion can be coercive,
then it makes little sense to conﬁne one’s eﬀorts to explaining why coercion
is wrong when it’s wrong. One should, rather, try to explain why it’s wrong,
when it’s wrong, to do things that are coercive.
But I reject this strategy, and the reason for this rejection is my third
point: coerciveness is a red herring. Coercion, when it is coercive, is wrong
for a reason having nothing to do with its being coercive. Coerciveness,
whatever it is, is some eﬀect that an action or circumstance can have on an
individual. Yet I deny that acts of coercion are wrong in virtue of the eﬀect
they have on the coerced individual. I mention this view now not because I
expect the reader to accept it; on the contrary, trying to establish it will
occupy a large part of this essay. Rather, I simply want to explain why I
focus my attention on coercion instead of coerciveness.
Thus, my aim here is to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong
without appealing to the eﬀects acts of coercion have on the coerced
individual. My initial focus will be a class of actions that, it is generally
agreed, is wrong and counts as coercion: conditional threats to do wrong. So
I am out to explain the principle
(P1) Conditionally threatening to do wrong is, per se, pro tanto wrong.
The ‘per se’ qualiﬁer is important here. In explaining the wrongfulness of
conditional threats to do wrong, we must avoid appealing to features that
only some such threats possess; otherwise we will not have explained the
wrongfulness of the entire set of such threats.
Furthermore, I am out to explain the principles
(P2) Unconditionally threatening to do wrong is, per se, pro tanto wrong.
and
(P3) Neither conditional warnings about one’s own future wrongdoing
nor conditional oﬀers to do wrong are, per se, pro tanto wrong.2
2By ‘conditional oﬀers to do wrong’, I mean an announcer’s oﬀer to do something that would wrong the
target if and only if the target did not accept the oﬀer. This deﬁnition might seem to render paradoxical the
idea of conditionally oﬀering to do wrong. When an agent issues an oﬀer to j he usually means to say
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is uncontroversially wrong, and explain why those actions are wrong. I will
then argue that an explanation of why those actions are wrong constitutes
an explanation of why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.
Second, one might be tempted to object straight oﬀ that I am begging
important questions by assuming that only threats can constitute coercion
and hence implicitly denying that people can be coerced by oﬀers or their
circumstances and that oﬀers and circumstances can be coercive. Actually,
however, I am not denying this. I am denying that an oﬀer can constitute
coercion and that one’s circumstances can constitute coercion. ‘Coercion’ is
the name of a type of action. ‘Coercive’ describes an eﬀect that some actions
and circumstances have on people, who are in turn ‘coerced’ by those
actions and circumstances. I do not insist that only coercion is coercive.
Now one might worry that if other things besides coercion can be coercive,
then it makes little sense to conﬁne one’s eﬀorts to explaining why coercion
is wrong when it’s wrong. One should, rather, try to explain why it’s wrong,
when it’s wrong, to do things that are coercive.
But I reject this strategy, and the reason for this rejection is my third
point: coerciveness is a red herring. Coercion, when it is coercive, is wrong
for a reason having nothing to do with its being coercive. Coerciveness,
whatever it is, is some eﬀect that an action or circumstance can have on an
individual. Yet I deny that acts of coercion are wrong in virtue of the eﬀect
they have on the coerced individual. I mention this view now not because I
expect the reader to accept it; on the contrary, trying to establish it will
occupy a large part of this essay. Rather, I simply want to explain why I
focus my attention on coercion instead of coerciveness.
Thus, my aim here is to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong
without appealing to the eﬀects acts of coercion have on the coerced
individual. My initial focus will be a class of actions that, it is generally
agreed, is wrong and counts as coercion: conditional threats to do wrong. So
I am out to explain the principle
(P1) Conditionally threatening to do wrong is, per se, pro tanto wrong.
The ‘per se’ qualiﬁer is important here. In explaining the wrongfulness of
conditional threats to do wrong, we must avoid appealing to features that
only some such threats possess; otherwise we will not have explained the
wrongfulness of the entire set of such threats.
Furthermore, I am out to explain the principles
(P2) Unconditionally threatening to do wrong is, per se, pro tanto wrong.
and
(P3) Neither conditional warnings about one’s own future wrongdoing
nor conditional oﬀers to do wrong are, per se, pro tanto wrong.2
2By ‘conditional oﬀers to do wrong’, I mean an announcer’s oﬀer to do something that would wrong the
target if and only if the target did not accept the oﬀer. This deﬁnition might seem to render paradoxical the
idea of conditionally oﬀering to do wrong. When an agent issues an oﬀer to j he usually means to say
Just what P2 and P3 have to do with P1 will be made clear later. Brieﬂy,
however, P2 and P3 are relevant because there are no extant explanations of
P1 that are consistent with P2 and P3. This constitutes a serious objection to
the extant explanations of P1 and constitutes a large part of the reason why
I reject those explanations. Of course, it is possible that we cannot have our
cake and eat it too. Perhaps in order to explain one of the principles we have
to give up another one. I take it, however, that these principles are
intuitively plausible enough to make it worth our while to try to hang on to
all of them.3
Before P1–3 can be explained, however, we need to distinguish
conditional threats from unconditional threats, conditional warnings about
one’s own intentions, and conditional oﬀers. This is the task I undertake in
x2. All four kinds of utterance are intention-announcements, so it requires a
bit of work to distinguish them from each other. My way of distinguishing
these four kinds of utterance is, I will argue, defensible independent of the
fact that it makes it easier to explain P1–3. My strategy will be to ﬁrst defend
what I will call the Non-Adoption Account, a descriptive account of
conditional threats. The reason why we should accept the Non-Adoption
Account, I shall argue, is that doing so is the only way to diﬀerentiate
conditional threats from conditional warnings while explaining how it is
possible for people to issue conditional threats. (Importantly, I will not
attempt to explain how this is possible for rational people.4 I am going to try
to explain how this is possible for people given the actual facts of human
psychology, ignoring all questions about the extent to which this psychology
is rational. This is the sensible approach for someone who is interested, as I
am, in exploring the ethics of threat issuing. We should want to know how
threats work when used by actual people.)
In what follows, I will use the word ‘announcer’ to refer to the individual
making an intention-announcement. I will use ‘target’ to refer to the
individual to whom the announcement is addressed.
2. What a Conditional Threat Is
2.1 Nozick’s Account
To appreciate the diﬃculty in explaining how conditional threats are both
possible and distinguishable from conditional warnings, consider the
descriptive account of conditional threats found in Robert Nozick’s classic
(among other things) that he will not j if the oﬀer is not accepted. But if the agent treats the target’s non-
acceptance as a bar to j-ing, and j-ing would be wrong only if it was done without the target’s acceptance,
then it would seem that the agent’s announcement does not actually raise the prospect of his wronging the
target. So he doesn’t really oﬀer to wrong the target; at best he oﬀers to ‘otherwise-wrong’ the target. I accept
all this. Henceforth when I refer to an ‘oﬀer to do wrong’ I mean ‘oﬀer to do otherwise-wrong’.
3I do not assume that the three principles are unimpeachable in their current form. I do not take up
objections to these principles, nor do I tinker with the principles in order to make them impervious to those
objections. This is a worthwhile project, but it is not my project. I aim only to explain the core truth that
these principles capture.
4Accordingly, I do not seek to make any contribution to philosophical thought about the rationality of
threatening or to game-theoretic thought about the likely outcomes of various uses of threats by rational
agents.
Why Coercion is 
Wrong When It’s 
Wrong
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
 A
nd
rew
s] 
at 
06
:16
 04
 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
66 Benjamin Sachs
[1969] paper. By way of motivating his account, Nozick oﬀers the example
of a labour dispute [ibid.: 453]:
[A]n election is about to be held in a factory to determine whether the
employees will be represented by a labor union. The owner of the factory
announces to his employees that if the union wins the election, he will close his
factory and go out of business.
Nozick assumes, implicitly, that the owner of the factory adopted the
announced intention before announcing it. The important question,
according to Nozick, is why he did so; it is the answer to this question that
determines whether the announcement was a threat. As Nozick is aware, if
the owner adopted the intention for self-interested reasons (because it’d be
good business, for example), we would think that his announcement of that
intention was a warning [ibid.: 456]. Nozick suggests that the announcement
qualiﬁes as a threat if the owner adopted the announced intention for a
strategic reason [ibid.: 455]. If, that is, the factory owner adopted his
conditional intention in order to be able to credibly threaten his employees
and thereby alter their behaviour. It is problematic, however, for Nozick to
portray the factory owner as adopting an intention for a strategic reason.
To see why, a distinction ﬁrst needs to be made. At the broadest level,
there are two kinds of reason for adopting an intention [Parﬁt 2001]. First,
there are object-given reasons: reasons having to do with the object of the
intention. An object-given reason to adopt an intention to go to California
would be a reason having to do with going to California. More technically,
an object-given reason to adopt an intention to go to California is any
reason that is (or is grounded in) a property of that prospective action: going
to California. Second, there are state-given reasons: reasons that are (or are
grounded in) properties of the state of aﬀairs of possessing the intention. It’s
been heavily debated whether it is rational to adopt an intention for a state-
given reason (see, for instance, Hampshire and Hart [1958], Anscombe
[1963], Kavka [1983], and Gauthier [1994]). What has gone unquestioned
thus far is whether it is possible to adopt an intention for a state-given
reason. This is an empirical question regarding which no evidence has been
systematically collected. Importantly, it is for our purposes a question about
the psychology of actual humans, and so we can make at least some progress
on it through simple introspection. For my part, when I imagine attempting
to adopt an intention for a state-given reason, it strikes me as impossible
that I could succeed. I will assume henceforth that actual humans cannot, in
fact, do this. This is crucial for Nozick’s descriptive account of threats, since
a strategic reason to adopt an intention is a state-given reason. And so what
Nozick describes is, given my assumption, impossible.
2.2 A New Account
Kent Greenawalt has hinted at a solution to this problem. He oﬀers a
thought experiment featuring Tim and Vicki. Tim wants to make love with
Vicki, and tells Vicki that if she refuses to make love with him he will tell
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[1969] paper. By way of motivating his account, Nozick oﬀers the example
of a labour dispute [ibid.: 453]:
[A]n election is about to be held in a factory to determine whether the
employees will be represented by a labor union. The owner of the factory
announces to his employees that if the union wins the election, he will close his
factory and go out of business.
Nozick assumes, implicitly, that the owner of the factory adopted the
announced intention before announcing it. The important question,
according to Nozick, is why he did so; it is the answer to this question that
determines whether the announcement was a threat. As Nozick is aware, if
the owner adopted the intention for self-interested reasons (because it’d be
good business, for example), we would think that his announcement of that
intention was a warning [ibid.: 456]. Nozick suggests that the announcement
qualiﬁes as a threat if the owner adopted the announced intention for a
strategic reason [ibid.: 455]. If, that is, the factory owner adopted his
conditional intention in order to be able to credibly threaten his employees
and thereby alter their behaviour. It is problematic, however, for Nozick to
portray the factory owner as adopting an intention for a strategic reason.
To see why, a distinction ﬁrst needs to be made. At the broadest level,
there are two kinds of reason for adopting an intention [Parﬁt 2001]. First,
there are object-given reasons: reasons having to do with the object of the
intention. An object-given reason to adopt an intention to go to California
would be a reason having to do with going to California. More technically,
an object-given reason to adopt an intention to go to California is any
reason that is (or is grounded in) a property of that prospective action: going
to California. Second, there are state-given reasons: reasons that are (or are
grounded in) properties of the state of aﬀairs of possessing the intention. It’s
been heavily debated whether it is rational to adopt an intention for a state-
given reason (see, for instance, Hampshire and Hart [1958], Anscombe
[1963], Kavka [1983], and Gauthier [1994]). What has gone unquestioned
thus far is whether it is possible to adopt an intention for a state-given
reason. This is an empirical question regarding which no evidence has been
systematically collected. Importantly, it is for our purposes a question about
the psychology of actual humans, and so we can make at least some progress
on it through simple introspection. For my part, when I imagine attempting
to adopt an intention for a state-given reason, it strikes me as impossible
that I could succeed. I will assume henceforth that actual humans cannot, in
fact, do this. This is crucial for Nozick’s descriptive account of threats, since
a strategic reason to adopt an intention is a state-given reason. And so what
Nozick describes is, given my assumption, impossible.
2.2 A New Account
Kent Greenawalt has hinted at a solution to this problem. He oﬀers a
thought experiment featuring Tim and Vicki. Tim wants to make love with
Vicki, and tells Vicki that if she refuses to make love with him he will tell
Vicki’s parents, who are ardently opposed to abortion, that she recently had
an abortion. Greenawalt, explaining why this announcement qualiﬁes as a
conditional threat (or a ‘manipulative threat’, in Greenawalt’s parlance),
says the following [1983–4: 1098; see also 1989: 94–5 and 66–7]:
If Tim had for some reason only been able to communicate his wish to make
love but not the threat, his reasons for telling her parents would never come into
existence. We might imagine, for example, that Tim and Vicki speak diﬀerent
languages, and that Tim ﬁnds it much easier to convey his desire for sexual
relations than a threat to report a past behavior. If Tim did ﬁnd himself unable
to make Vicki understand the threat, he would see no point in carrying it out.
What Greenawalt seems to be saying is that before Tim is able to
communicate the conditional intention to tell Vicki’s parents of her
abortion, he does not have that conditional intention.5,6 I submit that this
is an essential feature of a conditional threat: it is the announcement of an
intention that one has not adopted before announcing it. Call this the Non-
Adoption Account of conditional threats.
The Non-Adoption Account certainly explains how it is possible to issue a
conditional threat, in that it does not attribute any unusual capability to
conditional threat-issuers. Yet it seems to introduce a new problem: how can
a threat be eﬀective in altering a target’s behaviour? If the target knows that
the announcer doesn’t actually have the conditional intention that he
announces, why would the target ever be moved to give in to the
announcer’s demand?
Greenawalt does not try to answer this question. But he could have
pointed out that although the announcer does not have his announced
conditional intention before announcing it, he might acquire that intention
contemporaneous with or subsequent to his announcement. As Greenawalt
[1983–4: 1098] notes, the announcer might have a desire to stick to his word,
and this could motivate him to adopt his announced intention before the
time comes to follow through (see Lamond [1996] for similar comments).
This is basic human psychology, and consequently the target should be
aware of it. This, then, explains how conditional threats can be eﬀective.
Note that we need not assume that the motivation is always suﬃcient to
induce the announcer to adopt the announced intention; this assumption is
clearly false. Many conditional threats are not followed through.
Fortunately, we can concede this and still explain why they are sometimes
eﬀective. While it is common knowledge that many conditional threats are
not followed through, many people who ﬁnd themselves the target of such a
5I am not sure whether Greenawalt understood himself as making this claim or appreciated the diﬀerence
between this claim and Nozick’s—the claim that in the case of a conditional threat the announced intention is
adopted in order to make it possible to issue a credible threat. (For evidence of possible confusion on
Greenawalt’s part, see Greenawalt [1989: 255]).
6It has been suggested to me that although Tim has not already adopted the conditional intention before
announcing it, he may have already conditionally adopted the intention before announcing it. In other words,
he may already have a plan to adopt-it-if-he-announces-it. This makes no trouble for me. Although it is true
that Tim already has a doubly conditional intention before he makes his announcement, it is enough for my
purposes if we can say that the intention Tim announces—the singly conditional intention—is not an
intention that he has already unconditionally adopted.
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threat have no reliable way of anticipating whether the announcer will
follow through. This uncertainty can explain why such targets often give in.
Why should we accept that this really explains what is going on in some
cases of eﬀective conditional threatening? First, as already noted, this
explanation appeals only to familiar psychological facts. Second, as a matter
of consistency it seems we must accept it. When we want someone to do
something we often ask that person to say that he is going to do it. We do this
even in those cases in which the other person has already expressed a willing-
ness to engage in the desired behaviour. For us, the intention-announcement
itself seems to be important. Why would this be? We believe, I submit, that the
person’s motivation to adopt an intention to c will increase because he
announces an intention to c. This belief explains our announcement-seeking
behaviour with respect to behaviour that we desire just as it explains our
announcement-aversion with respect to behaviour that we do not desire (e.g.,
our aversion to being threatened). The third reason to accept the Non-
Adoption Account is that the truth of this account makes it possible to draw
easy, intuitively appealing distinctions between conditional threats and the
other kinds of intention-announcement, as I shall now illustrate kind-by-kind.
2.3 Distinguishing Conditional Threats from Unconditional Threats
An unconditional threat, unlike a conditional threat, is not (typically) a good
vehicle for getting one’s target to behave a certain way. It may seem, in fact,
that issuing an unconditional threat would be pointless, and so one may
wonder whether there really is such a thing. However, any temptation to draw
this conclusion should vanish given the stipulation that we are concerned with
actual people, not rational people. It may not be rational to issue an
unconditional threat, but undoubtedly people do it. People really do say things
like, ‘One of these days, I’m going tomake you sorry for what you did to me.’ I
suspect that such utterances are typically motivated by a desire to strike fear in
others or a desire to manipulate oneself into adopting a particular intention.
The same argument that demonstrated the need for a Non-Adoption
Account of conditional threats applies, mutatis mutandis, to unconditional
threats. We need an analysis of unconditional threats that distinguishes
them from unconditional warnings while not rendering it impossible to issue
an unconditional threat. To the best of my knowledge, there is no way to do
this without insisting that in cases of unconditional warning the announced
intention is an intention the announcer has not adopted before announcing
it. So the Non-Adoption Account applies to both conditional and
unconditional threats. The only diﬀerence between the two, I submit, is
whether the announced intention is conditional.
2.4 Distinguishing Conditional Threats from Conditional Oﬀers
Next, consider conditional oﬀers. David Zimmerman [1981] says that a
conditional oﬀer is a proposal such that its target prefers his post-proposal
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threat have no reliable way of anticipating whether the announcer will
follow through. This uncertainty can explain why such targets often give in.
Why should we accept that this really explains what is going on in some
cases of eﬀective conditional threatening? First, as already noted, this
explanation appeals only to familiar psychological facts. Second, as a matter
of consistency it seems we must accept it. When we want someone to do
something we often ask that person to say that he is going to do it. We do this
even in those cases in which the other person has already expressed a willing-
ness to engage in the desired behaviour. For us, the intention-announcement
itself seems to be important. Why would this be? We believe, I submit, that the
person’s motivation to adopt an intention to c will increase because he
announces an intention to c. This belief explains our announcement-seeking
behaviour with respect to behaviour that we desire just as it explains our
announcement-aversion with respect to behaviour that we do not desire (e.g.,
our aversion to being threatened). The third reason to accept the Non-
Adoption Account is that the truth of this account makes it possible to draw
easy, intuitively appealing distinctions between conditional threats and the
other kinds of intention-announcement, as I shall now illustrate kind-by-kind.
2.3 Distinguishing Conditional Threats from Unconditional Threats
An unconditional threat, unlike a conditional threat, is not (typically) a good
vehicle for getting one’s target to behave a certain way. It may seem, in fact,
that issuing an unconditional threat would be pointless, and so one may
wonder whether there really is such a thing. However, any temptation to draw
this conclusion should vanish given the stipulation that we are concerned with
actual people, not rational people. It may not be rational to issue an
unconditional threat, but undoubtedly people do it. People really do say things
like, ‘One of these days, I’m going tomake you sorry for what you did to me.’ I
suspect that such utterances are typically motivated by a desire to strike fear in
others or a desire to manipulate oneself into adopting a particular intention.
The same argument that demonstrated the need for a Non-Adoption
Account of conditional threats applies, mutatis mutandis, to unconditional
threats. We need an analysis of unconditional threats that distinguishes
them from unconditional warnings while not rendering it impossible to issue
an unconditional threat. To the best of my knowledge, there is no way to do
this without insisting that in cases of unconditional warning the announced
intention is an intention the announcer has not adopted before announcing
it. So the Non-Adoption Account applies to both conditional and
unconditional threats. The only diﬀerence between the two, I submit, is
whether the announced intention is conditional.
2.4 Distinguishing Conditional Threats from Conditional Oﬀers
Next, consider conditional oﬀers. David Zimmerman [1981] says that a
conditional oﬀer is a proposal such that its target prefers his post-proposal
situation to his pre-proposal situation, whereas a conditional threat is a
proposal such that its target prefers his pre-proposal situation to his post-
proposal situation. The ‘situation’ is constituted by the options the target
has. Yet while a target’s option set may be shaped in part by the announcer’s
intentions, it is never aﬀected by what the announcer says his intentions are.
Thus, threats don’t alter situations in the relevant sense.
A diﬀerent account is oﬀered by Nozick, Alan Wertheimer and Harry
Frankfurt, who distinguish conditional oﬀers from conditional threats by
saying that in the case of a conditional oﬀer, the announced conditional
intention is an intention to make the target better-oﬀ, whereas a conditional
threat is the announcement of a conditional intention tomake the target worse-
oﬀ [Nozick 1969: 447–53; Wertheimer 1987: ch. 12; Frankfurt 1988: 28].7 This
way of drawing the distinction, however, cannot allow for what I will call
ridiculously bad conditional oﬀers. These are conditional oﬀers such that a) the
thing that the announcer conditionally oﬀers to do is objectively bad for the
target, and b) the announcer and the target both know this. I don’t have any
persuasive examples of such oﬀers; any example would appear bizarre, seeing
as the very act-type is itself bizarre. But the point is simply that it is possible in
principle for there to be ridiculously bad conditional oﬀers; it is not a necessary
truth about oﬀers that they must not be ridiculously bad. (Remember, we are
not making any assumptions about the rationality of human behaviour.)
This datum—that there can be ridiculously bad conditional oﬀers—raises
an interesting question: what’s the diﬀerence between making a ridiculously
bad conditional oﬀer and making a conditional threat? The answer, I think,
is clear: the target of a ridiculously bad conditional oﬀer gets to accept or
reject it,8 whereas the target of a conditional threat has no such power.
When an announcer threatens, ‘If you don’t j I will c’, he gives his target
the power to cause or prevent the announcer’s c-ing (by j-ing or refraining
from j-ing) but does not give his target the power to cause or prevent the
announcer’s adoption of the conditional intention to c. The recipient of an
oﬀer, by contrast, is endowed with this power.
Surprisingly, then, sometimes when an announcer utters something of the
form, ‘If you don’t j I will c’, he does not actually assert that he has
adopted or will adopt a conditional intention to c. Sometimes what he
asserts is that if the target accepts then he (the announcer) will adopt a
conditional intention to c. I maintain that conditional oﬀers essentially have
this propositional content. Further, I submit, conditional threats essentially
do not.9 (When the mugger says, ‘If you don’t give me your wallet I’ll shoot
7Similarly, Lamond [1996, 2010] suggests that a conditional threat is the announcement of a conditional
intention to do something that the target wants not to occur or believes will make him worse oﬀ. The
objection I am about to raise against the Nozick/Wertheimer/Frankfurt account applies to Lamond’s as well.
8And thereby return to the status quo.
9This claim has been disputed. The most famous challenge to it is Nozick’s slave case. In Nozick’s words,
‘Suppose that usually a slave owner beats his slave each morning, for no reason connected with the slave’s
behavior. Today he says to his slave, ‘‘Tomorrow I will not beat you if and only if you now do A’’’ [1969:
450]. Here the slave is (apparently) given the power to control whether the slave-owner adopts his announced
conditional intention, and yet Nozick considers it reasonable to categorize the utterance as a threat. I suspect,
however, that this willingness arises from the prior commitment, held by Nozick, that threats and oﬀers are
distinguished from each other according to the content of the announced intention. If one were not in the
grip of this theory, it would strike one as obvious that the slave owner’s utterance is an oﬀer. Alternatively, it
may stem from a desire to accommodate the claim that the slave-owner’s oﬀer is coercive. However, once we
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you’, he is not asserting that you need to accept and fail to give him your
wallet in order to get shot.) Conditional oﬀers and conditional threats are
similar, then, in that the Non-Adoption Account applies to them. The
diﬀerence is that in the case of a conditional oﬀer, but not in the case of a
conditional threat, the announcer asserts that some action on the target’s
part (an acceptance) is required to trigger his (the announcer’s) adoption of
the announced conditional intention.
2.5 Distinguishing Conditional Threats from Conditional Warnings about
One’s Own Future Intentions
There is something suspicious about conditional warnings about one’s own
future intentions. In issuing a conditional warning about one’s own future
wrongdoing one speaks of one’s agency in an impersonal way, as if it were
not under one’s control. This may give rise to a suspicion that any talk of an
announcer’s issuing a conditional warning about his own intentions is at best
just a euphemistic way of referring to the announcer’s issuing of a threat.
This suspicion, however, would be misguided. The clearest real examples
of warnings about one’s own intentions are the ‘I know myself’ cases—
instances in which an agent anticipates that some turn of events could
trigger malevolent behaviour on his part and would like to avert the
triggering event. Even the sub-class of warnings about one’s own future
wrongdoing contains genuine instances. These would be cases in which an
individual can anticipate his own future wrongdoing, and not because he
anticipates losing his moral agency but rather because he anticipates that his
concern to do right might be trumped by something else he cares about. I
have in mind, for instance, the protective parent who warns, ‘If you lay a
ﬁnger on my child . . .’.
Greenawalt [1983–4: 1096] claims that, when one sincerely issues a
warning about one’s own intentions, one already has the announced
intention. This feature is present in the ‘I know myself’ cases and, I submit,
is an essential feature of warnings about one’s own intentions. Thus,
conditional warnings about one’s own intentions and conditional threats
diﬀer in that the Non-Adoption Account applies only to the latter.
If this is true, then there should be no fool-proof way to discern whether
one has been conditionally threatened or conditionally warned. If we reﬂect
on what it is like to be a target of a malevolent intention-announcement, I
think we will ﬁnd that this is true. Speciﬁcally, we should take note of the
familiar fact that it is often diﬃcult to know how to respond to one.
(Consider, for instance, the situation faced by Nozick’s factory workers
after their boss’s announcement that if they unionize he will close the
factory.)10
realize that other things besides coercion can be coercive, there is no pressure to label the slave-owner’s
announcement a threat (and hence coercion) on account of its coerciveness.
10Since it is often diﬃcult to know whether one has been threatened, it will also often be diﬃcult to know
whether one has been wrongfully coerced.
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you’, he is not asserting that you need to accept and fail to give him your
wallet in order to get shot.) Conditional oﬀers and conditional threats are
similar, then, in that the Non-Adoption Account applies to them. The
diﬀerence is that in the case of a conditional oﬀer, but not in the case of a
conditional threat, the announcer asserts that some action on the target’s
part (an acceptance) is required to trigger his (the announcer’s) adoption of
the announced conditional intention.
2.5 Distinguishing Conditional Threats from Conditional Warnings about
One’s Own Future Intentions
There is something suspicious about conditional warnings about one’s own
future intentions. In issuing a conditional warning about one’s own future
wrongdoing one speaks of one’s agency in an impersonal way, as if it were
not under one’s control. This may give rise to a suspicion that any talk of an
announcer’s issuing a conditional warning about his own intentions is at best
just a euphemistic way of referring to the announcer’s issuing of a threat.
This suspicion, however, would be misguided. The clearest real examples
of warnings about one’s own intentions are the ‘I know myself’ cases—
instances in which an agent anticipates that some turn of events could
trigger malevolent behaviour on his part and would like to avert the
triggering event. Even the sub-class of warnings about one’s own future
wrongdoing contains genuine instances. These would be cases in which an
individual can anticipate his own future wrongdoing, and not because he
anticipates losing his moral agency but rather because he anticipates that his
concern to do right might be trumped by something else he cares about. I
have in mind, for instance, the protective parent who warns, ‘If you lay a
ﬁnger on my child . . .’.
Greenawalt [1983–4: 1096] claims that, when one sincerely issues a
warning about one’s own intentions, one already has the announced
intention. This feature is present in the ‘I know myself’ cases and, I submit,
is an essential feature of warnings about one’s own intentions. Thus,
conditional warnings about one’s own intentions and conditional threats
diﬀer in that the Non-Adoption Account applies only to the latter.
If this is true, then there should be no fool-proof way to discern whether
one has been conditionally threatened or conditionally warned. If we reﬂect
on what it is like to be a target of a malevolent intention-announcement, I
think we will ﬁnd that this is true. Speciﬁcally, we should take note of the
familiar fact that it is often diﬃcult to know how to respond to one.
(Consider, for instance, the situation faced by Nozick’s factory workers
after their boss’s announcement that if they unionize he will close the
factory.)10
realize that other things besides coercion can be coercive, there is no pressure to label the slave-owner’s
announcement a threat (and hence coercion) on account of its coerciveness.
10Since it is often diﬃcult to know whether one has been threatened, it will also often be diﬃcult to know
whether one has been wrongfully coerced.
This concludes my descriptive analysis of the four kinds of intention-
announcement. I have identiﬁed one or two necessary features of each kind.
For the purposes of this paper, that is as good as oﬀering a complete
conceptual analysis of each kind. My goal here is to explain P1–3, and to do
that we simply need to be able to correctly categorize any intention-
announcement with which we are confronted. The work I have done in this
section allows us to do that.
3. Explaining P1: Conditionally Threatening to Do Wrong Is,
Per Se, Wrong11
3.1 The Inadequacy of the Extant Explanations of P1
I want to concede, straight oﬀ, that there is a good extant explanation of
why conditionally threatening to do wrong is sometimes wrong: condition-
ally threatening to wrong a person can, for example, scare, humiliate, or
disgrace that person. However, this is not an explanation of P1. An
explanation of P1 would tell us why conditionally threatening to do wrong is
wrong per se, not merely on those occasions when it has certain eﬀects.12 It
is this kind of explanation, I will argue here, that has not yet been oﬀered.
And it will not do to simply point out that it is wrong to adopt a conditional
intention to do wrong.13 This is an answer to a diﬀerent question. Our
question is why it might be wrong to announce such an intention. That
question presents something of a conundrum: how can the announcement of
a malevolent intention add anything to the wrongness of adopting it and
following through on it? Only an answer to this question will count as an
explanation of P1.
The extant answers to this question can be divided into two kinds. The
ﬁrst kind of answer homes in on the eﬀects that such an announcement has
on its target’s circumstances. The second kind focuses on the eﬀects that
such an announcement has on the target’s mental states.
Let’s start with the ﬁrst kind of answer. What objectionable eﬀect might a
conditional threat to do wrong have on the target’s circumstances? I am
aware of just one answer to this question: threats to do wrong are wrong
because they wrongly restrict the target’s options [Fowler 1982; Zimmerman
1981; Pallikkathayil 2011].14 Suppose the announcer says, ‘If you don’t j
I will c’, where the announcer’s c-ing would wrong the target. Whereas
before the utterance, the target had the option of not-j-ing and avoiding
the announcer’s c-ing, the target no longer has this option [Nozick 1969;
11For the rest of the paper I drop the cumbersome ‘pro tanto’ qualiﬁer. It should be understood as implicit in
all my future uses of ‘wrong’.
12Thanks to Japa Pallikkathayil and Alan Wertheimer for pushing me to clarify my stance on this.
13Grant Lamond [2002: 49] seems to believe that pointing this out amounts to explaining P1. He says, ‘. . .
what makes all cases of [coercion by threat] stand in need of a defence is the fact that they involve the plan
purposely to bring about something unwelcome to another’. See also Haksar [1976], who believes coercion is
wrong for a second reason as well—namely, it places wrongful pressure on the coerced party. For an
explanation of the problem with this proposal, see note 20.
14Pallikkathayil holds that this wrong gives rise to an additional wrong. For a sceptical view about the moral
importance of the structure of one’s options, see Wertheimer [1987, ch. 11].
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Feinberg 1986: 191–2; Raz 1986: 150]. Since the threatener’s c-ing would, ex
hypothesi, wrong the target, the threat robs the target of an option to which
he is entitled. But this won’t do as an explanation of P1. As I mentioned in
x2.4, the announcing of an intention cannot change the target’s available
options.
So we turn to the second kind of answer. What objectionable eﬀect might a
conditional threat to do wrong have on the target’s mental states? The
common answer to this question is that the announcement can constitute an
invasion or undermining of the target’s freedom or autonomy. In order for
this suggestion to get us anywhere, we are going to need an analysis of the
undermining of freedom/autonomy that does not reduce it to some alteration
of the target’s circumstances. Just such analyses have been oﬀered by Harry
Frankfurt and Joseph Raz. Frankfurt [1988: 44–5] maintains that an
individual’s freedom or autonomy is undermined when he is caused to
behave in accordance with a motive by which he would prefer to not be
moved, while Raz [1986: 148–57, 410] contends that autonomy is invaded
when A subjects B to A’s will.15 But these analyses of the undermining of
freedom of autonomy cannot be used as the basis of an explanation of P1.16
The resulting explanation would explain both too little and too much.
It would explain too little because conditional threats inﬂuence the
target’s motivation or will only when they are successful, so the objection
would apply only to successful conditional threats. Yet it seems that the
wrongness of issuing a conditional threat has nothing to do with whether it
turns out to be successful (we don’t think that people who bravely resist
conditional threats of wrongdoing have not been wronged). Hence it would
not explain why conditionally threatening to do wrong is wrong per se, and
thus it wouldn’t qualify as an explanation of P1.17,18
The purported explanation of P1 would explain too much in two ways.
First, conditional threats can inﬂuence the target’s motivation or will
regardless of whether the threatened action would be wrong. So this objec-
tion to conditionally threatening to do wrong would extend to conditionally
threatening to do not-wrong. This runs counter to the widespread intuition
that some successful conditional threats are entirely unobjectionable
[Greenawalt 1989: 98], such as the threats that parents use against their
children to ensure their good behaviour. Second, as we learned in x2, there
need be no diﬀerence in propositional content between conditional threats
on the one hand and conditional warnings about one’s own intentions and
15For Raz, this is just one way of invading someone’s autonomy. The other is by restricting a person’s
options in a signiﬁcant way. But we have already seen why this cannot be the basis of an explanation of P1.
16For Frankfurt and Raz, they weren’t supposed to.
17It has been suggested to me that the mere attempt to undermine someone’s autonomy or freedom might be
morally objectionable. But it strikes me as implausible to suggest that very many threat-issuers are
attempting to do such a thing to their targets—at least they are not attempting it in the sense of having an
intention to do it (which is the morally relevant sense of ‘attempting’, I take it). Whether the motive that he
forces his target to act upon is one that the target ﬁnds distasteful is totally unimportant to the announcer
(unless he’s sadistic). And whether the target’s will becomes subject to the agent’s is, again, unimportant. The
important thing to the announcer is just that the target acts a certain way.
18Another point about this explanation of P1 is that it could not be extended to unconditional threats;
unconditional threats are not designed to inﬂuence the target’s motivation or will. So this objection to
conditional threats to do wrong would leave us at square one in attempting to explain P2. Of course, we
cannot rule out the possibility that P1 and P2 have distinct explanations.
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Feinberg 1986: 191–2; Raz 1986: 150]. Since the threatener’s c-ing would, ex
hypothesi, wrong the target, the threat robs the target of an option to which
he is entitled. But this won’t do as an explanation of P1. As I mentioned in
x2.4, the announcing of an intention cannot change the target’s available
options.
So we turn to the second kind of answer. What objectionable eﬀect might a
conditional threat to do wrong have on the target’s mental states? The
common answer to this question is that the announcement can constitute an
invasion or undermining of the target’s freedom or autonomy. In order for
this suggestion to get us anywhere, we are going to need an analysis of the
undermining of freedom/autonomy that does not reduce it to some alteration
of the target’s circumstances. Just such analyses have been oﬀered by Harry
Frankfurt and Joseph Raz. Frankfurt [1988: 44–5] maintains that an
individual’s freedom or autonomy is undermined when he is caused to
behave in accordance with a motive by which he would prefer to not be
moved, while Raz [1986: 148–57, 410] contends that autonomy is invaded
when A subjects B to A’s will.15 But these analyses of the undermining of
freedom of autonomy cannot be used as the basis of an explanation of P1.16
The resulting explanation would explain both too little and too much.
It would explain too little because conditional threats inﬂuence the
target’s motivation or will only when they are successful, so the objection
would apply only to successful conditional threats. Yet it seems that the
wrongness of issuing a conditional threat has nothing to do with whether it
turns out to be successful (we don’t think that people who bravely resist
conditional threats of wrongdoing have not been wronged). Hence it would
not explain why conditionally threatening to do wrong is wrong per se, and
thus it wouldn’t qualify as an explanation of P1.17,18
The purported explanation of P1 would explain too much in two ways.
First, conditional threats can inﬂuence the target’s motivation or will
regardless of whether the threatened action would be wrong. So this objec-
tion to conditionally threatening to do wrong would extend to conditionally
threatening to do not-wrong. This runs counter to the widespread intuition
that some successful conditional threats are entirely unobjectionable
[Greenawalt 1989: 98], such as the threats that parents use against their
children to ensure their good behaviour. Second, as we learned in x2, there
need be no diﬀerence in propositional content between conditional threats
on the one hand and conditional warnings about one’s own intentions and
15For Raz, this is just one way of invading someone’s autonomy. The other is by restricting a person’s
options in a signiﬁcant way. But we have already seen why this cannot be the basis of an explanation of P1.
16For Frankfurt and Raz, they weren’t supposed to.
17It has been suggested to me that the mere attempt to undermine someone’s autonomy or freedom might be
morally objectionable. But it strikes me as implausible to suggest that very many threat-issuers are
attempting to do such a thing to their targets—at least they are not attempting it in the sense of having an
intention to do it (which is the morally relevant sense of ‘attempting’, I take it). Whether the motive that he
forces his target to act upon is one that the target ﬁnds distasteful is totally unimportant to the announcer
(unless he’s sadistic). And whether the target’s will becomes subject to the agent’s is, again, unimportant. The
important thing to the announcer is just that the target acts a certain way.
18Another point about this explanation of P1 is that it could not be extended to unconditional threats;
unconditional threats are not designed to inﬂuence the target’s motivation or will. So this objection to
conditional threats to do wrong would leave us at square one in attempting to explain P2. Of course, we
cannot rule out the possibility that P1 and P2 have distinct explanations.
conditional oﬀers on the other; the diﬀerence can be all in the head of the
announcer. Thus, it stands to reason that if conditional threats can alter
their target’s mental states in the ways Frankfurt and Raz describe,
conditional warnings about one’s own intentions and conditional oﬀers can
as well.19 So if we say that threats to do wrong are wrong in virtue of the
eﬀect they have on their target’s mental states, then we have no choice but to
say that conditional warnings about one’s own wrongdoing and conditional
oﬀers to do wrong are objectionable in the same way. Thus, we render
ourselves unable to explain P3.20
Let me brieﬂy summarize what I have argued in this sub-section. We are
looking for an explanation of P1, and we found that conditional threats to
do wrong can have eﬀects on the mental states of the target, but none of
these eﬀects is unique to conditional threats. In particular, they are shared
by conditional warnings of one’s own future intentions and conditional
oﬀers. Furthermore, they are not shared by unconditional threats. So this
way of explaining P1 puts P2 and P3 in jeopardy. The other strategy for
explaining P1 is to point out the eﬀects that a conditional threat to do wrong
has on its target’s circumstances. But it turns out that conditional threats
have no such eﬀects at all. The lesson to be learned from this sub-section,
then, is that we cannot appeal to the eﬀects of threats to do wrong on the
target’s mental states or circumstances in order to explain their wrongful-
ness. This being the case, then a fortiori we cannot appeal to the coerciveness
of coercion in order to explain its wrongfulness, since the coerciveness of an
action, whatever it is, surely is some kind of eﬀect that the action has on the
its target’s mental states or circumstances.
3.2 A New Explanation of P1
Given the inadequacy of these explanations of P1, it would be worth our
while to ask whether there are any explanations of P1 that naturally follow
from the Non-Adoption Account. One would hope that we could look to
Nozick or Greenawalt for an answer to that question, since their work on
conditional threats formed the basis for the Non-Adoption Account.
19This is conﬁrmed by ordinary experience. Conditional warnings and conditional oﬀers can cause us to act
from unsavoury motives (in the case of conditional warnings—fear; in the case of oﬀers—greed or
desperation). They can also be used to inﬂuence a target to act in the way the announcer would have him act,
which strikes me as the best gloss on what it means to make one person’s will subject to another’s.
20Mitchell Berman identiﬁes the wrong of coercion (and by extension, conditional threatening, I take it) as
having to do with the fact that coercion puts pressure on the coerced party. This appears to be another appeal
to the eﬀects that conditional threat issuing can have on the mental states of one’s target, but it is not
vulnerable to the objection I just levelled against other versions of that appeal. This is because Berman
speciﬁes that coercion places ‘wrongful pressure on [the target’s] freedom to choose otherwise’ [2002: 53].
Greenawalt [1989: 97–8, 104] claims, similarly, that one reason why some conditional threats may be properly
criminalized is that they place improper pressure on the target.
The insertion of the ‘wrongful’ or ‘improper’ qualiﬁer makes it possible to avoid some of the problems that
confronted the Frankfurt/Raz-inspired explanation of P1. In particular, it does not commit one to saying
that warning-issuers and oﬀer-issuers do wrong when they put pressure on their targets. So we can say that
inﬂicting pressure by announcing a conditional intention to do wrong is only sometimes wrong. And this
would be because the pressure itself—the very same pressure—is only sometimes wrongful or improper. But
why would that be? Certainly it’s not a brute fact. Unfortunately, no explanation of it jumps out; certainly
neither Berman nor Greenawalt has attempted to explain it. So this explanation of P1 does not explain what
is to be explained.
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Unfortunately, neither Nozick nor Greenawalt—nor Alan Wertheimer,
whose descriptive account of conditional threats [1987: 96–9] largely follows
the Nozick/Greenawalt account—have ever tried to answer this moral
question about conditional threats.
First, let’s distinguish two kinds of case. The Non-Adoption Account tells
us that when an announcer issues a conditional threat, he does not, before
making his announcement, have the intention that he announces. But there
are two ways of lacking an intention to c: one either has an intention to not-
c (or an intention to j, where j-ing is incompatible with c-ing and one
knows this) or no intention at all with respect to c.
Take the ﬁrst case—the case of bluﬃng. A bluﬃng threat is a lie. Thus, it
is vulnerable to whatever objection applies to lying and wrong in any
context in which lying is wrong. In those cases in which the bluﬀ is used
successfully to extract something from the target, we can say furthermore
that the announcer has defrauded the target.
The second case is more complex. To ground an objection to this kind of
conditional threat, we need two premises. First, a general moral principle: if it
would be wrong for an agent to c at t2, then it would be wrong for that agent
to give himself at t1 signiﬁcant motivation to adopt an intention to c-at-t2.
The second premise is that an individual’s threatening to c signiﬁcantly
motivates him to adopt an intention to c. According to the Non-Adoption
Account, when a person conditionally threatens to c he does not, before
making his announcement, conditionally intend to c. And we have seen how
issuing a conditional threat can motivate a person to adopt his announced
intention (x2.2).
These two premises yield the conclusion that if it would be wrong of an
announcer to c at t2, then it would be wrong of that announcer to issue a
conditional threat at t1 to c-at-t2. This is just a restatement of P1.
Of course for a certain kind of person, this objection would not apply.
Premise two says that the issuing of a threat is a signiﬁcant source of
motivation to do what one threatens to do. There could be people for whom
this is not true—people who are left more or less cold by all the usual
considerations of self-respect, strategy, and character that motivate most
people to keep their word. Whether this amounts to much of an objection to
my argument here depends, I think, on whether we think it’s wrong for such
people to conditionally threaten to do wrong. (Remember, I am trying only
to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.) This is something we
almost never have occasion to ponder, since it’s nearly impossible to identify
people who are left cold in this way. (They have strong reasons to conceal
this fact about themselves.) Indeed, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to even paint a mental
picture of such a person. If she doesn’t care about self-respect, strategy or
character, what does she care about? Is she a sociopath? A nihilist? Neither?
Is she a moral agent? I don’t know what to say.21
21I have been considering the possibility that premise two is false in the case of psychologically atypical
people. Another possibility is that it is false in atypical circumstances (even for psychologically normal
people). I was alerted to this point by an anonymous referee, who oﬀered the following thought experiment:
Mobster Tony Soprano tells his daughter, Meadow, that he will kill her boyfriend unless she breaks up with
him. The fact of the matter is that Tony has never even considered killing Meadow’s boyfriend. And as soon
as Tony hears himself saying this, he is immediately horriﬁed by the idea of actually doing it. Contemplating
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Unfortunately, neither Nozick nor Greenawalt—nor Alan Wertheimer,
whose descriptive account of conditional threats [1987: 96–9] largely follows
the Nozick/Greenawalt account—have ever tried to answer this moral
question about conditional threats.
First, let’s distinguish two kinds of case. The Non-Adoption Account tells
us that when an announcer issues a conditional threat, he does not, before
making his announcement, have the intention that he announces. But there
are two ways of lacking an intention to c: one either has an intention to not-
c (or an intention to j, where j-ing is incompatible with c-ing and one
knows this) or no intention at all with respect to c.
Take the ﬁrst case—the case of bluﬃng. A bluﬃng threat is a lie. Thus, it
is vulnerable to whatever objection applies to lying and wrong in any
context in which lying is wrong. In those cases in which the bluﬀ is used
successfully to extract something from the target, we can say furthermore
that the announcer has defrauded the target.
The second case is more complex. To ground an objection to this kind of
conditional threat, we need two premises. First, a general moral principle: if it
would be wrong for an agent to c at t2, then it would be wrong for that agent
to give himself at t1 signiﬁcant motivation to adopt an intention to c-at-t2.
The second premise is that an individual’s threatening to c signiﬁcantly
motivates him to adopt an intention to c. According to the Non-Adoption
Account, when a person conditionally threatens to c he does not, before
making his announcement, conditionally intend to c. And we have seen how
issuing a conditional threat can motivate a person to adopt his announced
intention (x2.2).
These two premises yield the conclusion that if it would be wrong of an
announcer to c at t2, then it would be wrong of that announcer to issue a
conditional threat at t1 to c-at-t2. This is just a restatement of P1.
Of course for a certain kind of person, this objection would not apply.
Premise two says that the issuing of a threat is a signiﬁcant source of
motivation to do what one threatens to do. There could be people for whom
this is not true—people who are left more or less cold by all the usual
considerations of self-respect, strategy, and character that motivate most
people to keep their word. Whether this amounts to much of an objection to
my argument here depends, I think, on whether we think it’s wrong for such
people to conditionally threaten to do wrong. (Remember, I am trying only
to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.) This is something we
almost never have occasion to ponder, since it’s nearly impossible to identify
people who are left cold in this way. (They have strong reasons to conceal
this fact about themselves.) Indeed, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to even paint a mental
picture of such a person. If she doesn’t care about self-respect, strategy or
character, what does she care about? Is she a sociopath? A nihilist? Neither?
Is she a moral agent? I don’t know what to say.21
21I have been considering the possibility that premise two is false in the case of psychologically atypical
people. Another possibility is that it is false in atypical circumstances (even for psychologically normal
people). I was alerted to this point by an anonymous referee, who oﬀered the following thought experiment:
Mobster Tony Soprano tells his daughter, Meadow, that he will kill her boyfriend unless she breaks up with
him. The fact of the matter is that Tony has never even considered killing Meadow’s boyfriend. And as soon
as Tony hears himself saying this, he is immediately horriﬁed by the idea of actually doing it. Contemplating
Another worry about the second premise is that it is internally incon-
sistent. How can it be that in cases of threatening the announcer does
not describe himself as having any particular intention and that the issuing
of the threat motivates the announcer to keep his word? If the announcer
has not asserted anything about himself, what word is there for him to
keep?
By way of response, there is nothing in the Non-Adoption Account that
precludes us from saying that in issuing a threat an announcer asserts that
he has the intention he announces; the theory simply says that he doesn’t
actually have that intention (before announcing it). Indeed, it would make
sense for the threat-issuer to make such an assertion, since threat-issuers
should want to be perceived as warning-issuers. I am not sure whether to
endorse this response, since it has the somewhat counterintuitive implication
that all threats are insincere. Fortunately, there is a more sureﬁre response
available: while threat-issuers might not portray themselves as currently
possessing any particular intention, they certainly do portray their future
selves—the selves that will exist when the time comes to act or not act—as
having their announced intention. This utterance is an assertion, and thus it
puts the announcer in a position to keep or break his word.22
Thus, I think the second premise can be vindicated. As to the ﬁrst
premise, the only worry I can see being raised is that motivating oneself to
adopt an intention to do wrong is too indirectly related to wrongdoing itself
to be objectionable. The indirectness here is twofold. First, gaining
motivation to adopt an intention to c does not guarantee that one will
adopt an intention to c. But we do think that motivating others to adopt
wrongful intentions can be wrong, even though the mere provision of
motivation is insuﬃcient to guarantee such adoption. We call it incitement,
and I see no reason why self-incitement would be less objectionable than
other-incitement. Second, adopting an intention to c does not guarantee c-
ing. This is true—intentions can always be rethought—but it does make c-
ing more likely. As Raz [1975] points out, adopting an intention to c
necessarily involves terminating, at least temporarily, one’s deliberations
about whether to c. In this way, adopting an intention to c makes c-ing the
default course of action, and thereby makes it more likely that one will c.23
the act for the ﬁrst time has such a profound eﬀect on Tony that it settles for him decisively the question of
whether he will under any circumstances commit the murder.
Given my descriptive account of conditional threats, Tony has issued a conditional threat. So according to
premise two of the argument of this section, Tony’s announcement should cause him to become signiﬁcantly
motivated to adopt the announced intention. Plausibly, however, it doesn’t. Consequently, the argument I
have just given for the wrongness of conditionally threatening to do wrong doesn’t explain why what Tony
did was wrong.
I concede all this, but maintain that a diﬀerent argument for the wrongness of conditionally threatening to
do wrong can be oﬀered to deal with cases of this kind. By ‘of this kind’, I mean cases in which, owing to
circumstances that the threat-issuer cannot have foreseen, his issuing of the threat has the eﬀect of making it
less likely that he will adopt the announced intention. In cases like this, we should say that the announcer
does wrong in virtue of acting negligently with respect to the possibility of becoming motivated to adopt the
wrongful intention. Remember, the fact that announcing an intention that one doesn’t yet have serves as
motivation to adopt it is basic human psychology. So one can be expected to anticipate what will happen as a
result of one’s threat-issuing.
22Thanks to Collin O’Neil for discussing this and the previous objection with me.
23Thomas Pink [2008: 153–4] goes so far as to say that adopting an intention to c causes one to c.
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Since the argument is valid and its premises appear to be true, it seems we
must accept the conclusion—P1.24
3.3 Conditional Threats and Coercion
My goal in this essay is to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.
Since coercion involves the issuing of a conditional threat, I have sought to
explain why issuing a certain kind of conditional threat—a conditional
threat to do wrong—is wrong. But does that suﬃce to explain why coercion
is wrong when it’s wrong? That depends on whether some other element of
coercion is wrongful. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are cases
in which coercion involves a threat to do something that’s not wrong. In
these cases coercion is not wrong. So we may continue to focus on cases of
coercion that involve a conditional threat to do wrong. Our only remaining
questions, then, are these: When an act of coercion includes a conditional
threat to do wrong, does it include anything more than that? And if so, are
any of those other things ever wrongful?
There are three things that can happen when a person issues a conditional
threat to do wrong. (In what follows I use the proposition, ‘If you don’t j I
will c’, as a template for such a threat.) The ﬁrst possibility is that the target
stands his ground and the announcer doesn’t c. In other words, after the
conditional threat is issued nothing happens. In this case, coercion involves
nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat.
In the second kind of case, the target stands his ground and the announcer
does c. Does his c-ing count as part of the act of coercion? Surely not. The
target put an end to the coercion when he stood his ground.25 Now the
announcer is just c-ing, nothing more.26 So in this case, too, coercion
involves nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat.
The third kind is the case in which the target gives in—he js. Is the
coercion ongoing while the target js, or did the coercion end with the
issuing of the conditional threat? I’m not sure how to answer this question,
but I’ll grant for the sake of argument the claim that coercion can be
temporally extended such that it includes the period during which the target
js. But even if coercion is temporally extended, it need contain only one
24Even if we cannot identify a premise to reject, perhaps it’s reasonable to withhold our acceptance of P1 if it
has severely counterintuitive implications. I have assumed thus far that the conclusion is one we already
accept and simply need to explain, but perhaps this is not the case. There is one case, the case of nuclear
deterrence, which is often thought to present a challenge to P1 (as noted by Scott Anderson [2011: x3.2]). In
these cases, Country A threatens to deploy nuclear weapons against Country B if Country B deploys nuclear
weapons against Country A. Of course, nuclear deterrence is just one member of a class of cases in which one
threatens wrongdoing in order to deter wrongdoing. Another case—this one by way of Alan Wertheimer
[1987: 102]—is saying to a burglar, ‘I’ll shoot you if you take my television’. Many people, and I must admit
I’m one of them, are tempted to say that it is morally permissible to issue such threats. So P1 might be in need
of some tinkering. But this truly would be mere tinkering. Such counterexamples arise only in degenerate
contexts. In the central contexts P1 is true. This assertion represents the sum total of my allegiance to P1, and
the sum total of what I have sought to explain.
25Some theorists believe that if the target stands his ground, then there is no coercion, but rather attempted
coercion. (For a list of them, see Anderson [2011: x2.1.2].) I can happily accept this claim; it does not cast
doubt on the point I am about to make regarding the wrongfulness of coercion.
26Of course, the c-ing itself might be coercion, but it is not coercion-by-threat, which I stipulated in the
introduction is my only concern here.
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Since the argument is valid and its premises appear to be true, it seems we
must accept the conclusion—P1.24
3.3 Conditional Threats and Coercion
My goal in this essay is to explain why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.
Since coercion involves the issuing of a conditional threat, I have sought to
explain why issuing a certain kind of conditional threat—a conditional
threat to do wrong—is wrong. But does that suﬃce to explain why coercion
is wrong when it’s wrong? That depends on whether some other element of
coercion is wrongful. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are cases
in which coercion involves a threat to do something that’s not wrong. In
these cases coercion is not wrong. So we may continue to focus on cases of
coercion that involve a conditional threat to do wrong. Our only remaining
questions, then, are these: When an act of coercion includes a conditional
threat to do wrong, does it include anything more than that? And if so, are
any of those other things ever wrongful?
There are three things that can happen when a person issues a conditional
threat to do wrong. (In what follows I use the proposition, ‘If you don’t j I
will c’, as a template for such a threat.) The ﬁrst possibility is that the target
stands his ground and the announcer doesn’t c. In other words, after the
conditional threat is issued nothing happens. In this case, coercion involves
nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat.
In the second kind of case, the target stands his ground and the announcer
does c. Does his c-ing count as part of the act of coercion? Surely not. The
target put an end to the coercion when he stood his ground.25 Now the
announcer is just c-ing, nothing more.26 So in this case, too, coercion
involves nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat.
The third kind is the case in which the target gives in—he js. Is the
coercion ongoing while the target js, or did the coercion end with the
issuing of the conditional threat? I’m not sure how to answer this question,
but I’ll grant for the sake of argument the claim that coercion can be
temporally extended such that it includes the period during which the target
js. But even if coercion is temporally extended, it need contain only one
24Even if we cannot identify a premise to reject, perhaps it’s reasonable to withhold our acceptance of P1 if it
has severely counterintuitive implications. I have assumed thus far that the conclusion is one we already
accept and simply need to explain, but perhaps this is not the case. There is one case, the case of nuclear
deterrence, which is often thought to present a challenge to P1 (as noted by Scott Anderson [2011: x3.2]). In
these cases, Country A threatens to deploy nuclear weapons against Country B if Country B deploys nuclear
weapons against Country A. Of course, nuclear deterrence is just one member of a class of cases in which one
threatens wrongdoing in order to deter wrongdoing. Another case—this one by way of Alan Wertheimer
[1987: 102]—is saying to a burglar, ‘I’ll shoot you if you take my television’. Many people, and I must admit
I’m one of them, are tempted to say that it is morally permissible to issue such threats. So P1 might be in need
of some tinkering. But this truly would be mere tinkering. Such counterexamples arise only in degenerate
contexts. In the central contexts P1 is true. This assertion represents the sum total of my allegiance to P1, and
the sum total of what I have sought to explain.
25Some theorists believe that if the target stands his ground, then there is no coercion, but rather attempted
coercion. (For a list of them, see Anderson [2011: x2.1.2].) I can happily accept this claim; it does not cast
doubt on the point I am about to make regarding the wrongfulness of coercion.
26Of course, the c-ing itself might be coercion, but it is not coercion-by-threat, which I stipulated in the
introduction is my only concern here.
action on the part of the announcer: conditionally threatening the target.
Aside from conditionally threatening, the announcer can be entirely passive.
So if coercion is a temporally extended action, and it need only involve
conditional threatening, then the conditional threatening must itself be a
temporally extended action. In other words, it must be that while the target
js the announcer continues to press his threat in virtue of not withdrawing
it. To me, this seems sensible; for one thing it would make sense of our
inclination to say that if the target gives in and js, he js ‘under threat’. So
even in the case in which the target gives in, there is only one action on the
part of the announcer: the conditional threatening.
We may conclude from this investigation that wrongful coercion always
involves the issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong and never involves
anything more than that. So it turns out that an explanation of P1 is an
explanation of why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.
I contend that the explanation of P1 that I gave in x3.2 is the best one
available. First, it relies only on an ordinary moral principle (premise 1 of
my argument)27 and everyday observations about human psychology (which
constitute the case for premise 2 of my argument). Furthermore, the other
posited explanations have serious ﬂaws (x3.1)—most importantly that they
put pressure on us to reject P2 and P3. What remains to be shown is that my
explanation lacks those same ﬂaws.
4. Explaining P2: Unconditionally Threatening to Do Wrong Is,
Per Se, Wrong
Very little has been written on the morality of unconditional threatening,
and what has been written is less than satisfying. Anderson [2011: x3.2]
claims that ‘making a conditional threat is often a more troublesome and
ethically problematic act than making a plain, unconditional threat’. This, I
think, runs contrary to common sense. As far as I can tell, the usual belief is
that threatening to do wrong is wrong whether the threat is conditional or
unconditional, and that any variation in the degree of wrongness arises from
variation in how wrong the threatened act would be.
T. M. Scanlon [2008: 76] seems to agree that unconditional threats
(or what he calls ‘nonincentive threats’) are less morally objectionable
than conditional threats (‘incentive threats’). As to why unconditional
threats should be objectionable at all, here is what Scanlon has to say
[loc. cit.]:
When nonincentive threats are wrong, this impermissibility is mostly explained
by the impermissibility of inﬂicting the penalty. . . . The impermissibility of a
nonincentive threat can be explained on the ground that if it is wrong to do
something to a person, then it is wrong to give him good grounds for fearing
that you are going to do it.
27Actually, it relies on another ordinary moral principle: that it is wrong to lie. This takes care of the case of
bluﬃng threats.
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Why would it be wrong to give a person good grounds for fearing that you
will wrong him? Presumably because fear is an unpleasant mental state and
so giving someone good grounds for fear is likely to cause harm to that
person.
Scanlon is right, I think, to postulate that issuing an unconditional threat
can be wrong in virtue of how it gives the target good grounds for fear. Yet
Scanlon has not succeeded in explaining P2, because one can threaten to
wrong a person without giving that person good grounds for fear. Perhaps
the threatened person is unusually stoic. Why, then, should it be wrong to
issue the threat? Of course, Scanlon might respond that what constitutes
good grounds for a fear-response does not vary based on who the person is.
But in the morally relevant sense, it does. Analogously, what constitutes
teasing somebody too much, morally speaking, depends on just how thick-
skinned the particular person is, not how thick-skinned most people are.
If we accept what I said earlier, that the Non-Adoption Account is true
and that the only diﬀerence between conditional and unconditional threats
is the conditionality (or lack thereof) of the announced intention, then we
can say that unconditional threats to do wrong are objectionable for the
same reason as conditional threats to do wrong: the issuing of a bluﬃng
unconditional threat is a lie, and the issuing of an non-bluﬃng uncondi-
tional threat to do wrong motivates the announcer to do wrong.
5. Explaining P3: Neither Conditional Warnings about One’s Own Future
Wrongdoing Nor Conditional Oﬀers to Do Wrong Are, Per Se, Wrong
5.1 The Inadequacy of the Extant Explanations of P3
As I said at the outset, threats, conditional oﬀers, and conditional warnings
about one’s own intentions are all intention-announcements. Consequently,
one might worry about being able to identify a moral diﬀerence among
them. Scanlon, in fact, uses this worry to motivate his discussion of the
impermissibility of threats. Unfortunately, the account that he settles on
does not manage to explain why there should be a diﬀerence in
permissibility between threats, on the one hand, and conditional warnings
and conditional oﬀers, on the other.
Scanlon’s account has two parts; corresponding to the two objections he
levels against threatening. The second objection [ibid.: 80–7] focuses on the
wrongness of adopting and acting upon certain intentions. Consequently it
fails to address the central conundrum about threats identiﬁed earlier: it tells
us nothing about why the announcement itself might be objectionable. The
ﬁrst objection, however, focuses on the announcement itself, and is therefore
worth a closer look.
Here, Scanlon argues that the announcement can change the meaning of
some of the target’s possible future actions in a way that the target has good
reasons to object to. Scanlon oﬀers the example of the employer who
threatens to ﬁre his female employee unless she has sex with him. Whereas
before the announcement the employee faced the simple choice of having sex
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Why would it be wrong to give a person good grounds for fearing that you
will wrong him? Presumably because fear is an unpleasant mental state and
so giving someone good grounds for fear is likely to cause harm to that
person.
Scanlon is right, I think, to postulate that issuing an unconditional threat
can be wrong in virtue of how it gives the target good grounds for fear. Yet
Scanlon has not succeeded in explaining P2, because one can threaten to
wrong a person without giving that person good grounds for fear. Perhaps
the threatened person is unusually stoic. Why, then, should it be wrong to
issue the threat? Of course, Scanlon might respond that what constitutes
good grounds for a fear-response does not vary based on who the person is.
But in the morally relevant sense, it does. Analogously, what constitutes
teasing somebody too much, morally speaking, depends on just how thick-
skinned the particular person is, not how thick-skinned most people are.
If we accept what I said earlier, that the Non-Adoption Account is true
and that the only diﬀerence between conditional and unconditional threats
is the conditionality (or lack thereof) of the announced intention, then we
can say that unconditional threats to do wrong are objectionable for the
same reason as conditional threats to do wrong: the issuing of a bluﬃng
unconditional threat is a lie, and the issuing of an non-bluﬃng uncondi-
tional threat to do wrong motivates the announcer to do wrong.
5. Explaining P3: Neither Conditional Warnings about One’s Own Future
Wrongdoing Nor Conditional Oﬀers to Do Wrong Are, Per Se, Wrong
5.1 The Inadequacy of the Extant Explanations of P3
As I said at the outset, threats, conditional oﬀers, and conditional warnings
about one’s own intentions are all intention-announcements. Consequently,
one might worry about being able to identify a moral diﬀerence among
them. Scanlon, in fact, uses this worry to motivate his discussion of the
impermissibility of threats. Unfortunately, the account that he settles on
does not manage to explain why there should be a diﬀerence in
permissibility between threats, on the one hand, and conditional warnings
and conditional oﬀers, on the other.
Scanlon’s account has two parts; corresponding to the two objections he
levels against threatening. The second objection [ibid.: 80–7] focuses on the
wrongness of adopting and acting upon certain intentions. Consequently it
fails to address the central conundrum about threats identiﬁed earlier: it tells
us nothing about why the announcement itself might be objectionable. The
ﬁrst objection, however, focuses on the announcement itself, and is therefore
worth a closer look.
Here, Scanlon argues that the announcement can change the meaning of
some of the target’s possible future actions in a way that the target has good
reasons to object to. Scanlon oﬀers the example of the employer who
threatens to ﬁre his female employee unless she has sex with him. Whereas
before the announcement the employee faced the simple choice of having sex
or not having sex with her boss, she now has the choice of not having sex or
having coerced sex with her boss. The boss’s issuing of the threat has
changed the meaning of the employee’s possible future decision to have sex
with him. More generally, when one threatens, ‘If you don’t j I will c’, one
turns the target’s option of j-ing into the option of being pushed around
[ibid.: 75–80].
This account, unfortunately, doesn’t do enough to explain what’s
distinctive about threats. As Scanlon acknowledges, sometimes the issuing
of a conditional oﬀer alters the meaning of the recipient’s options in ways
that the recipient has reason to object to. This happens, for instance, when
one is oﬀered money to engage in an activity that one would have done out
of charity [ibid.: 79–80]. Moreover, Scanlon fails to notice that his account
doesn’t manage to fully distinguish threats from conditional warnings. Just
as one can be pushed around by a conditional threat, so can one be pushed
around by a conditional warning. Some taunts have this eﬀect.
5.2 A New Explanation of P3
If we accept my argument in x2.5 about the diﬀerence between threats and
conditional warnings, it becomes easy to understand how conditional
warnings about one’s own future wrongdoing escape the moral objection to
which threats to do wrong are vulnerable. Premise 2 in my moral argument
against non-bluﬃng conditional threats to do wrong says that the issuing of
such a threat motivates the announcer to adopt the announced intention.
This is not true of conditional warnings. When one issues a conditional
warning about one’s own future wrongdoing, one already has the wrongful
conditional intention.28 Thus, conditional warnings escape the moral
objection.29
To explain why conditional oﬀers to do wrong escape the moral objection
to which some non-bluﬃng conditional threats are subject, we need only
recall the point I made earlier: oﬀering, like warning, does not motivate the
announcer to adopt his announced intention. As explained in x2.4, in
making the announcement the oﬀerer puts the matter of his intention-
adoption in the target’s hands. The target can prevent the announcer from
adopting the announced conditional intention by simply not accepting the
oﬀer. Thus, the only thing that can motivate the announcer to adopt the
28It has been suggested to me that it is bizarre that an important moral diﬀerence, the diﬀerence between its
being permissible or impermissible to announce an intention to do wrong, could turn on a trivial empirical
diﬀerence: whether the adoption of the announced intention preceded the announcement of it, even by an
instant. The point I have been at pains to make, however, is that the given empirical diﬀerence is not
empirically trivial at all. That slight diﬀerence in timing makes all the diﬀerence as to whether one’s intention-
announcement can signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood of one’s adopting that intention.
29When discussing threats, I said that people are motivated to keep their word, and therefore by making such
an intention-announcement the announcer thereby gains motivation to adopt his announced intention. But if
this claim is true, then it holds for conditional warnings as well, although in the case of conditional warnings
what one gains is motivation to maintain the intention to do what one announces one will do. The important
question, morally speaking, is: when that happens does one become more likely to do what one already
intends to do? The answer is no. If an announcer has a malevolent conditional intention to c then he becomes
less likely to c when he announces this conditional intention to his target. This is because the making of the
announcement informs the target of something he (the target) can do to deter the announcer’s c-ing. (Thanks
to Alan Wertheimer for pointing this out to me.)
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announced conditional intention, when the announcement is a conditional
oﬀer, is the target’s own action of accepting the conditional oﬀer.
5.3 An Objection
One might worry that in this section I have gone too easy on conditional
warnings and conditional oﬀers and that, because of this, I have left us no
way of objecting to wrongful behaviour that involves only a conditional
warning or a conditional oﬀer. Extortion, at least some instances of it, ﬁts
this description. To illustrate, consider the following case. X and Y strike an
agreement whereby X will purchase Y’s car for $5000. However, after
receiving X’s $5000 deposit, Y announces that the price has just gone up.
Now it will take an additional $1000 to secure the title to the car. Y assures
X that if he refuses then his initial $5000 will not be refunded.
Let’s assume that before announcing that the price had gone up Y had
already adopted the conditional intention to keep X’s initial $5000 if X does
not hand over another $1000. This assumption means that on my account
Y’s announcement of this conditional intention is a warning, not a threat.
Yet it seems that he has acted wrongfully. How can we account for that,
given what I have said about conditional warnings?30 What we can (and
should) say is that Y has done wrong in virtue of having adopted a
conditional intention to keep X’s initial $5000 if X does not hand over
another $1000. Adopting this intention is wrongful because carrying out the
intention would involve breaking a promise.
At the beginning of x3 I posed the question, ‘How can the communication
of a malevolent intention add anything to the wrongness of adopting it and
following through on it?’ Given what I have argued here, the following
answer should appear plausible: it can’t. The actual adoption of a malevolent
intention is often subject to moral objection, whereas the announcement of it
is objectionable only when it motivates the announcer to adopt it. So in cases
in which the announced intention has already been adopted (i.e., cases of
conditional warning), any moral objection is going to have to focus on the act
of intention-adoption, as in extortion. In cases in which the announced
intention has not already been adopted, any moral objection is going to have
to focus on the act of intention-announcement. If announcing the intention is
a lie (i.e., in cases of bluﬃng threats) or gives the announcer motivation to
adopt the announced intention (i.e., in cases of non-bluﬃng threats), that
objection may go through. If the intention-announcement is inert (i.e., in
cases of conditional oﬀering), the objection will not go through.
6. Conclusion
My goal here has been to show that once we gain a proper understanding of
what a conditional threat is, the moral orthodoxy about coercion becomes,
30I thank Oren Bar-Gill for alerting me to this objection.
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announced conditional intention, when the announcement is a conditional
oﬀer, is the target’s own action of accepting the conditional oﬀer.
5.3 An Objection
One might worry that in this section I have gone too easy on conditional
warnings and conditional oﬀers and that, because of this, I have left us no
way of objecting to wrongful behaviour that involves only a conditional
warning or a conditional oﬀer. Extortion, at least some instances of it, ﬁts
this description. To illustrate, consider the following case. X and Y strike an
agreement whereby X will purchase Y’s car for $5000. However, after
receiving X’s $5000 deposit, Y announces that the price has just gone up.
Now it will take an additional $1000 to secure the title to the car. Y assures
X that if he refuses then his initial $5000 will not be refunded.
Let’s assume that before announcing that the price had gone up Y had
already adopted the conditional intention to keep X’s initial $5000 if X does
not hand over another $1000. This assumption means that on my account
Y’s announcement of this conditional intention is a warning, not a threat.
Yet it seems that he has acted wrongfully. How can we account for that,
given what I have said about conditional warnings?30 What we can (and
should) say is that Y has done wrong in virtue of having adopted a
conditional intention to keep X’s initial $5000 if X does not hand over
another $1000. Adopting this intention is wrongful because carrying out the
intention would involve breaking a promise.
At the beginning of x3 I posed the question, ‘How can the communication
of a malevolent intention add anything to the wrongness of adopting it and
following through on it?’ Given what I have argued here, the following
answer should appear plausible: it can’t. The actual adoption of a malevolent
intention is often subject to moral objection, whereas the announcement of it
is objectionable only when it motivates the announcer to adopt it. So in cases
in which the announced intention has already been adopted (i.e., cases of
conditional warning), any moral objection is going to have to focus on the act
of intention-adoption, as in extortion. In cases in which the announced
intention has not already been adopted, any moral objection is going to have
to focus on the act of intention-announcement. If announcing the intention is
a lie (i.e., in cases of bluﬃng threats) or gives the announcer motivation to
adopt the announced intention (i.e., in cases of non-bluﬃng threats), that
objection may go through. If the intention-announcement is inert (i.e., in
cases of conditional oﬀering), the objection will not go through.
6. Conclusion
My goal here has been to show that once we gain a proper understanding of
what a conditional threat is, the moral orthodoxy about coercion becomes,
30I thank Oren Bar-Gill for alerting me to this objection.
as a whole, much easier to make sense of. When an announcer issues a
conditional threat it is always the case, according to the theory I advanced
here, that he did not possess the announced intention before making his
announcement. With this account in hand, I tried to elucidate three aspects
of the common-sense morality about threats and other intention-announce-
ments. I turned ﬁrst to the question of the moral permissibility of
conditional threats, focusing on the cases in which the announced
conditional intention is an intention to wrong the target. I argued that in
those cases the issuing of the threat (when it is not a bluﬀ) is itself wrongful
because of the eﬀect that action has on the announcer—speciﬁcally,
motivating him to adopt the announced wrongful conditional intention. By
focusing on the eﬀect on the announcer, as opposed to the eﬀect on the
target’s mental states or circumstances, I accounted for why the announce-
ment of the intention, and not just the adoption of it, is morally
objectionable. I was also able to make clear why unconditional threats are
wrongful in the same way (i.e., because they have the same eﬀect on the
announcer) and conditional warnings of one’s own future wrongdoing and
conditional oﬀers to do wrong are not (i.e., they don’t). Finally, by showing
that coercion, when it’s wrong, is nothing more than the issuing of a
conditional threat to do wrong, I was able to demonstrate that my
explanation of the wrongness of conditionally threatening to do wrong is
also an explanation of why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong.
This may seem to amount to quite a demotion in moral importance for
wrongful coercion. If I am right, the wrongness of coercion is not to be
explained by reference to our most lofty or sacred moral values, such as
freedom and autonomy, but rather by reference to the wrongness of
motivating oneself to do wrong. I suspect it will seem to many that this
explanation cannot account for the moral egregiousness of wrongful
coercion. It seems that coercion, when wrong, is a particularly detestable
kind of wrongdoing. For my part, I accept this appearance as veridical, and
I would suggest that in order to accommodate it we should reconsider
whether the injunction against motivating oneself to do wrong shouldn’t
merit a place in the pantheon of high moral ideals.31
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